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Book Reviews  
Changes in Intelligence for an Age of Terror 
(Gregory F. Treverton. Intelligence for an Age of 
Terror. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.) 
A review by Scott Miller 
Gregory Treverton's book Intelligence for an Age of Terror is a very important and 
valuable work on the shifts in intelligence demands, and the, heretofore, lackluster 
responses to these evolving demands. Without assigning blame for recent terror attacks, 
Treverton clearly delineates the state of American intelligence capabilities in the context 
of changing threats to United States security in the form of terrorism. Treverton 
highlights the pervasive influence of Cold War security interests on intelligence 
organization and tactics, examining how these predications on traditional interstate 
conflict and threats are inadequate and inappropriate to address the current terrorist 
threat. These shortcomings are theoretical and organizational, affecting both the culture 
through which intelligence officers and analysts view their work, as well as the 
bureaucratic structures that dictate jurisdiction and authority. Furthermore, Treverton 
does not simply list the current problems faced by intelligence, he draws on his extensive 
professional experience to suggest possible options for implementing the changes 
necessary to properly address the threat of terrorism. Though the extent of these 
deficiencies are ambiguous, there are concrete examples of how the previous Cold War-
centric organization of intelligence is currently restricting effective management of the 
terrorist threat. 
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Treverton begins the book by discussing the changed nature of the risks intelligence 
seeks to combat, from a threat based on conventional warfare that respected boundaries 
of international law to a constantly evolving patchwork of groups who use any means 
necessary to accomplish their goals and actively change their tactics to exploit 
weaknesses in United States' defense. Secondly, Treverton explores the increasing 
number of intelligence consumers, including state and local government officials, 
whereas during the Cold War, intelligence was mainly used by high-level federal 
policymakers. Finally, Treverton acknowledges the problem of boundaries when faced 
with an enemy who does not respect boundaries — geographic or legal. I will briefly 
explore Treverton's analysis of each of these thematic problems, as well as his proposals 
for reforming intelligence to better suit its current needs. 
The nature of the threat faced directly affects the organizational culture that dictates the 
type of intelligence sought, and the means used to obtain such intelligence. That is, 
during the Cold War states were the primary intelligence target, and as so, intelligence 
gathering and analysis is based on such a threat. Treverton argues that nation-states 
provide a valuable context and "story" for intelligence officers and analysts to guide their 
thinking. States have documented histories, bureaucracies, and in many cases, similar 
goals, such as the defense of homeland. Therefore, the aim of intelligence is primarily 
that of puzzle-solving, what Treverton describes as "looking for additional pieces to fill 
out a mosaic of understanding whose broad shape is given" (17). Intelligence is 
concerned with knowing a state's nuclear capabilities, or standing troop levels — 
information that has a definite answer, and that fits into the context that a state provides. 
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On the other hand, non-state actors, as the current primary security concern to the United 
States, do not have the intrinsic back-story and perspective that a state actor provides. 
Instead of trying to fill in gaps of knowable information — the number of active troops a 
state has, for instance — intelligence is concerned with understanding the nuances and 
proclivities of individual groups and their goals. This understanding is then used to form 
best guesses, essentially, of what these actors will do; however, since this sort of 
intelligence is based on human thought and action, answers are not definitive until actions 
are carried out. Treverton terms this sort of intelligence as "mysteries." Instead of 
knowing that North Korea has X nuclear warheads, the product of mysteries is a "best 
forecast, perhaps in the form of a probability with key factors identified as well as how 
they bear on the estimate" (18). 
Obviously, this distinction in targets and subsequent outcomes is hugely relevant to the 
intelligence community's operations. Intelligence officers and analysts need to shift their 
thinking from trying to solve puzzles and finding definite answers to discovering terrorist 
intentions and forming comprehensive understanding of targets, so as to assess their 
intentions and make predictions based on probability as to where and when the next 
attack could take place. Treverton's explanation of theoretical problems and their 
subsequent application to structural organizations is really well done in this beginning 
section of the book. While there are plenty of places to lose the reader in the complexity 
of the issue being faced, Treverton carefully leads the discussion in a way that ensures 
that the reader will follow each logical extrapolation. Moreover, as this fundamental 
difference has received little mainstream attention, Treverton has brought valuable new 
ideas to the reform debate. 
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The next pattern Treverton discusses is the increased number of intelligence consumers 
and the wide range of actors this encompasses — from high-level federal policymakers to 
state and local law enforcement first responders, and even private sector groups that deal 
with critical infrastructure such as utilities companies. This necessary increase in 
consumers has lead to almost unanimous calls for augmented "information sharing," 
which Treverton rejects. He says that "information sharing" is the wrong phrase and 
attitude towards the problem of accommodating more and more consumers, because it 
perpetuates the idea that an agency owns the intelligence products it produces. Here 
again, Treverton demonstrates his years of experience by taking a serious problem in the 
intelligence structure, and rejecting the overly simplistic idea of information sharing, 
which reinforces "stovepiping" — a term used to refer to the vertical organization of 
intelligence agencies' information that precludes horizontal exchange with other agencies. 
Moreover, "information sharing" implies that the problem could be fixed by making it 
logistically easier to move information. Along these lines, the problem with intelligence 
dissemination is not in the technical means of doing so, but in the policies governing the 
exchange and distribution of products. Finally, Treverton (168-69) argues that 
information sharing implies that it is a top-down enterprise, in which federal agencies 
simply hand out intelligence products to state and local actors in a one-way fashion, when 
in reality, the nature of the terrorist threat demands cooperation occurring in both 
directions. 
Instead of a superficial, ad hoc solution to the problem of increased consumers, such as 
intelligence sharing, Treverton argues that a more fundamental, systemic answer needs to 
be addressed. Currently, intelligence policy and organization fosters security procedures 
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that maintain "need to know" standards that are very exclusive. However, as the number 
of consumers who need to know vital intelligence mushrooms, these security measures 
are ill equipped to handle such an influx (169). Though acknowledged as a problem by 
many others, Treverton seems alone in his appreciation of the importance of proper 
information distribution amongst relevant actors, and the systemic and fundamental 
reforms that are required to address this problem. 
Additionally, not only do the logistics of intelligence dissemination need to be 
reappraised, but the individual needs of different customers must be adequately met. For 
instance, private sector managers of critical infrastructure need to be apprised of the 
threats concerning their specific realm of responsibility, or in the case of individual 
private citizens, they need to be kept informed of the nature of threats facing them, and 
what the most appropriate responses are (185). While this may require much more 
manpower in order to organize such efforts, it is essential that relevant actors receive 
relevant intelligence that is actionable. 
These two crucial points that Treverton exposes are necessary in order to mitigate the 
terrorist threat as much as possible. While perfect prevention of terrorist attacks is an 
unrealistic goal to attempt, a sober realization that up-to-date information in the hands of 
pertinent actors will help stem the impact and scope of another attack is very reasonable. 
In this sense, the more information state, local, and private citizens have, the more readily 
all parties will be able to respond to an attack. Compared to the notion of information 
sharing, this strategy is much more appropriate in that it provides a path for implementing 
policy-level solutions to facilitate two-way exchanges of intelligence and information, as 
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well as enabling more appropriate intelligence products to reach their respective 
audiences. 
The final case of outdated intelligence policy Treverton discusses is the problem of how 
to adhere to certain legal and ethical boundaries while trying to combat an enemy that 
does not respect boundaries such as geographic borders or the distinction between 
military and civilian targets. This problem occurs within the context of a betrayed social 
contract between the American people and the intelligence community. 
Treverton (235) writes that due to the secretive and sometimes illegal nature of 
intelligence, the American people have essentially agreed to give license to intelligence 
operations with the understanding that intelligence officials would be sensitive to 
American political values. With the perceived intelligence failures of the September 11, 
2001, terrorist attacks, along with abuses of power such as Abu Ghraib or the "Torture 
Memos," this trust and social contract has been broken. However, intelligence and 
interrogation remain vital pieces in the strategy to prevent terrorist attacks and maintain 
the United States' security, especially against terrorists who actively try and exploit these 
boundaries as weaknesses in American defense. Therefore, Treverton (249) argues that 
the social contract must be rebuilt in a new manner that addresses the terrorist threat by 
allowing certain intelligence operations to occur, but, at the same time, acknowledging 
and working to prevent the sorts of abuses that have recently marred the reputation of 
intelligence agencies. Treverton's treatment of this final problem is no less satisfying than 
his previous proposals, again, mainly due to the fact that he concentrates on foundational 
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issues of the problem, instead of trying to explain how to deal with the superficial aspects 
of intelligence abuse scandals or the individual cases. 
An initial step in bridging this divide is to end the practices that gave rise to abuses of 
power, such as extraordinary rendition programs and enhanced interrogation techniques 
(240). Aside from preventing potential future abuses, this will aid intelligence and the 
broader campaign against Islamic extremists in a couple ways. First, as Treverton (240) 
states, "The conflict with Islamic extremist terrorists is ultimately a war of ideas, and we 
lose the war if we stoop to their methods." If the United States does not maintain certain 
legal and ethical standards, it will be committing heinous acts along with terrorists, thus 
plunging the entire campaign into moral ambiguity and undercutting its justification. 
Secondly, though Americans appreciate the checks and balances inherent in its federal 
government, other nations around the world do not necessarily see the recriminations and 
investigations that follow such an abuse of power, and instead are left with impressions 
of the United States as illegal and unethical (240). Since the campaign against terrorism 
and Islamic extremists is a global effort involving cooperation and alliances with many 
other countries in the international community, alienating foreign nations would further 
degrade the United States' legitimacy in the conflict. I find Treverton's concern with the 
opinion not only of American citizens, but of foreign nations refreshing in that he 
understands the value of public legitimacy. His contention that intelligence must not 
simply dupe citizens, or cover their tracks, but instead honestly hold up its end of the 
social contract is a solution that almost everyone would appreciate and champion. 
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While these abuses of power are not unique to the post-Cold War era and addressing 
them would not require any unusual circumstances, what is unique is the increased scope 
of operations that intelligence does require to combat terrorist threats. Certainly there 
needs to be an increased domestic intelligence role, including surveillance and 
investigation of American citizens. The key is knowing where to "strike the balance 
between privacy and security in the context of a changed threat and changing technology" 
(249). Treverton goes on to write that part of this balance is maintaining a context of 
legality to whatever programs are used, instead of the course the Bush Administration 
took immediately following the September 11th attacks by bypassing the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and conducting surveillance of American citizens 
without a warrant. Instead of abandoning the legal framework of FISA, the administration 
should have worked with Congress to implement any changes to FISA in order to 
maintain protection of civil liberties, as well as the framework of legality in intelligence 
operations. 
Legality and legitimacy are crucial to the effort against terrorism, as it will be a 
prolonged conflict, reaching beyond just the scope of military operations. Also, as a large 
part of this effort involves increased domestic intelligence, this adherence not only to 
codified law, but also to the less tangible well of public trust and political values, is 
fundamental to the success of intelligence and the broader conflict with Islamic 
extremists. As with previous sections, Treverton aptly explains that these deep-seeded 
problems cannot merely be fixed by a simple clarification of policy or quick revision; 
instead, a fundamental change has occurred in the nature of the threat facing the United 
States and the intelligence community charged with defending it. In order to properly 
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concentrate on this threat, intelligence must evolve from the Cold War product that 
defined its existence until recent history, and become more attuned to the unique threats it 
now faces, as well as the corresponding challenges involved in maintaining legal and 
ethical standards that the other side does not respect. In this sense, Gregory Treverton's 
book is a thorough, concise, actionable, and accurate plan for solving systemic problems 
that now frustrate intelligence efforts. 
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